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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper examines three aspects of a financial crisis of domestic origin. The first section 
studies the evolution of a debt-financed consumption boom supported by rising asset 
prices, leading to a credit crunch and fluctuations in the real economy, and, ultimately, to 
debt deflation. The next section extends the analysis to trace gradual evolution toward 
Ponzi finance and its consequences. The final section explains the link between the 
financial and the real sector of the economy, pointing to an inherent liquidity problem. 
The paper concludes with comments on the interactions between the three aspects.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Each financial crisis reminds one of the saying of an ancient Greek philosopher, “It is 
never possible to step into the same river twice” (Heraclitus, circa 544 B.C). Yet the ever-
changing river has some relatively unchanging attributes that make it possible to 
recognize it as the same river. Each financial crisis, too, has recurring features that 
remain similar, along with its own historical specificities that make each crisis different. 
The purpose of theory is to isolate these necessary characteristics, even if they might not 
be sufficient to adequately describe any particular crisis. Formal models are not 
historically accurate, but try to isolate the central mechanism that precipitates many 
financial crises. 
At least two features typically recur in a crisis. The first is loss of confidence, 
either in or by the financial sector. Since the system of credit money and the entire edifice 
of financial institutions function largely on the basis of mutual confidence among the 
players in the market, this leads to abrupt changes in lenders’ behavior as the proximate 
cause of the crisis. The second feature is the transmission of the crisis from the financial 
to the real economy through aggregate demand. In usual Keynesian analysis this typically 
operates through a sudden decline in real investment. However, at least in the recent 
financial crisis (starting in 2007), it seems the fragility of private consumption played the 
more crucial role. Thus, for simplicity of exposition we focus mostly on greater 
consumption expenditure sustained by rising asset prices (including housing) to examine 
the pattern of interaction between financial fragility and aggregate demand.
1  
Section II of the paper outlines a schematized model that explains how capital 
gains might drive debt-financed consumption expenditure resulting in fluctuations in both 
output and debt. Section III extends the argument to show how similarly fluctuating 
patterns prevail under more plausible assumptions about lending behavior of financial 
firms and banks, which takes into account borrowers’ ability to meet debt obligations 
from their current income. A simplified one-period version of Ponzi finance is postulated 
                                                 
1 Evidence accumulated (especially from the United States) on how debt-financed consumption expenditure 
becomes fragile over time. Despite some commentators sounding early warnings, this process continued 
unabated (see, for example, Baker [2006]; Campbell and Cocco [2006]; Dayan and Maki [2000]; Maki and 
Palumbo [2001]; Godley [2001 and 2002]; Gross [2004]). 
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to set the limit in this case. Section IV sets the argument in the context of financial 
fragility arising from increasing internal liquidity problems faced by the financial system 
itself. Its “fragility” is an expression of its inability to cope with the challenges of even 
relatively small, unanticipated defaults by means of the liquidity available within the 
system, leading to a reinterpretation of the Keynesian liquidity preference. In the present 
context it relates more to financial firms than to the general public (i.e., households and 
firms in the real sector). Section V concludes by bringing together different aspects of the 
argument. It explains how recurring liquidity problems and loss of confidence arise as a 
surface phenomenon of the deeper, evolving relationship between the financial and the 
real sector in developed-market economies. To avoid misunderstanding, it also comments 
on some additional complications that are important in many crises but not treated 
adequately in this paper.  
 
II. A MODEL OF FLUCTUATIONS DRIVEN BY CAPITAL GAINS AND DEBT-
FINANCED CONSUMPTION 
 
From the expenditure side, gross national product (GNP) consists of,  
 
GNP = Y = C + I + U       (1) 
 
Consumption, C, is assumed to be partly autonomous and partly induced by income. 
However, increases in wealth and the stock of inherited debt also influence the level of 
consumption, captured by, 
 
C = c1Y + c 2 (dW/dt) -c 3 ρ D + K1,      (2) 
 
with arbitrary constants c1,c 2 ,c 3> 0; K1 = autonomous part of consumption; and W = 
wealth of the private consumers. Note that the wealth effect is shown as operating 
through rising asset values and capital gains, rather than the stock of wealth.
2 While the 
                                                 
2 The assumption of continued capital gains based on information provided by an “efficient” capital market 
was indeed the essence of the model of “great moderation.” On this basis, the Federal Reserve System   4
conventional real balance effect depends on the stock wealth, the emphasis here is on the 
increase in wealth on the assumption (substantiated by recent experience) that both higher 
borrowing as well as lending are particularly facilitated by rising asset prices. Borrowers 
can meet their debt repayment obligations without difficulty from their capital gains, 
while the lenders also lend more leniently with a more comfortable balance sheet, caused 
by rising asset prices. The increase in wealth (dW/dt) occurs mostly through higher prices 
of assets (including housing and real estates). In a macroeconomic sense, this is notional 
increase in so far as it cannot be realized on a macro scale without setting off strong 
bearish tendencies in the market. However, on the micro scale, higher wealth makes each 
individual wealth owner more creditworthy in the eyes of the lending institutions, while 
simultaneously expanding the credit base of individual lending institutions through an 
increase in the value of their assets on their balance sheets. This results in the expansion 
of actual credit against notional capital gains. Nevertheless, the stock of inherited debt, D, 
exerts a negative influence on consumption through the repayment burden. With ρ  as the 
repayment coefficient, this explains its negative sign in equation (2).  
Persistent current account deficit (U) is covered by increased foreign debt (D F ) as 
liabilities to foreigners denominated in the same currency, assumed to be a stable 
domestic currency. For simplicity of exposition we assume the current account deficit is 
partly autonomous (K 2 ) and the rest induced by net import as a function of GNP, i.e. 
 
U = (dD F /dt) = n1Y+K 2   ,    (3) 
 
where n1>0 is the net import propensity. 
Similarly, keeping the exposition simple, investment (I) is assumed to have an 
autonomous part (K 3) and the rest is induced by income,  
                                                                                                                                                 
(Fed) refused to intervene in a situation of continuously rising asset (housing) prices and a consumption-led 
boom financed by rising indebtedness of households until the very end, which was marked by financial 
meltdown (staring around September 2007). This story is not unfamiliar. “... in the 1920s, convinced that 
skilled monetary management at the Federal Reserve and the rise of new professionally run investment 
trusts had reduced the riskiness of markets, Irving Fisher declared on 15 October that stock prices have 
reached ‘what looks like a permanently high plateau.’” This was just before the Great Crash leading to the 
severest depression of the last century (Fox [2009a]; also Fox [2009b]). 
   5
 
I = n 2 Y + K 3, n 2 >0.     (4) 
  
The critical feature of the debt-driven economy is a positive relation between 
increasing (notional) wealth and increasing (actual) debt-financed consumption. We 
assume (for expositional simplicity) strict proportionality, 
 
(dW/dt)  =  w(dD/dt),       (5) 
 
with w>0, a positive constant. 
Using (2), (3), (4), and (5) in (1), we obtain the time behavior of Y, governed 
solely by the dynamics of the flow and stock of debt and an autonomous term, K, i.e., 
 
Y = a(dD/dt) – mrD + mK,       (6) 
 
where a= mc 2 w > 0, r=c 3 ρ , and m = (1-c1-n 1 - n 2 )
1 − >0; K = (K1+K 2 +K 3) = an 
autonomous term, is assumed for simplicity to be a time-independent positive constant. 
The transmission mechanism from debt to income generation in the real economy 
through effective demand is outlined by focusing first on a highly simplified case of 
lending behavior by financial institutions. We postulate that there is an arbitrarily given 
ceiling, E, to the stock of debt such that,  
 
(dD/dt) = A>0 for D < E   and   (dD/dt) = 0 for D = E.  (7) 
 
On these assumptions, with positive borrowing supported by a steady flow of debt 
at the constant rate A > 0, Y would be at its maximum value when debt repayment 
burden is at its minimum, D=0, to yield from (6):   
 
Y max = aA + mK   and   D min= 0    (8) 
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On the other hand, a minimum value of Y is reached when debt repayment burden 
is at its maximum,  
 
Y min= aA+mK-mr.E   and   D max=  E    (9) 
 
Under these assumptions, the economy fluctuates abruptly between the maximum 
and the minimum value of Y in a two-dimensional plane of the stock of debt (D) and 
income (Y). With the stock of debt initially assumed to be at zero, D min=0, Y starts at its 
maximum, Y max, with no repayment burden of debt in (8). However, as the flow of debt 
continues at a steady rate, A, the stock of debt accumulates over time to reach the ceiling 
D max= E over t1= (E/A) periods. At that maximum burden of repayment of debt, with 
debt at its ceiling, E, Y is reduced to its minimum value Y min in (9) with an abrupt 
switching off of all lending according to (7).  
Y min in (9) marks the beginning of a recession, when the positive wealth effect 
also ceases due to the switching off of all credit flows to private consumers. However, the 
situation can get worse, because all lending stops at D = E, but the obligation for 
repayment on accumulated debt—with its depressing effect on consumption—continues. 
Repayment obligation would generally be met largely through the forced sale of assets 
under distress. A gradual reduction of debt begins as (dD/dt) turns negative. This is the 
classic case of debt deflation as the economy slides into a deepening recession (Fisher 
1933). Y falls even below its minimum level (Y min) given in (9), as the flow of debt 
(dD/dt) and its associated wealth effect on consumption turn negative. However, the 
inherited stock of debt (D) also begins to decrease and the repayment burden on debt 
begins to falls gradually. This process continues until debt reaches a sufficiently low 
value for lending to start again and recover to begin.
3 
                                                 
3 With forced sale, asset prices might continue to fall, making the debt repayment burden increasingly 
heavier and recovery more difficult. In more extreme cases recovery becomes impossible without 
government intervention. This point is discussed at length in section 4 on financial fragility.   7
The possibility of debt deflation is incorporated in the formal analysis by 
assuming that the economy switches instantly to a debt retirement mode at the rate B as 
soon as all flow of debt stops at the debt ceiling, i.e.,   
 
(dD/dt) = - B, B > 0 at D = E.     (10) 
 
Combining (6) and (10) it is easy to see that Y falls below even its earlier 
specified minimum value in (9) due to the operation of a negative wealth effect to yield 
an even lower minimum value, which lies below Y min in (9) and is given by,  
 
Y min Ext = mK - aB - mrE.      (11) 
 
However, as the stock of debt also begins to fall at the rate B and the repayment 
burden gradually eases, income begins to rise from that lowest level given by (11). 
The argument can be summed up algebraically. Using (7) and (10) we represent 
the increasing and decreasing phases in the stock of debt over time as, 
 
    D = tA, for t≤ t1,       (12) 
 
where t1= E/A,  
 
  D = (E-tB) = for t ≥t1.    (13) 
 
From (6) we depict the time paths of Y as, 
 
    Y(t) = aA - mr(tA) + mK , for t≤t1  (14) 
 
   Y(t) = mK - mr(E-tB) - aB , for t≥t1,     (15) 
 
with an instantaneous switch between the two modes at time t=t1at D=E.   8
Since from (12) and (14), (dD/dt) =A and (dY/dt) = - mrA, whereas from (13) and 
(15), (dD/dt) = -B and (dY/dt) = + mrB, it follows from the chain rule of differentiation 
that in both the increasing and decreasing phase of the stock of debt, the same slope, z, 
obtains between D and Y, i.e., 
 
(dY/dD)= z = - mr.         (16) 
 
The stock of debt increases for (E/A) = t1 periods and then it decreases for the 
next (E/B) = t 2  periods. Since, in general, A≠ B, it follows that t1 ≠ t 2 , implying the 
duration of the two phases of increasing and decreasing debt might differ.  
Geometrically the analysis is summarized in figure 1. Starting initially at zero 
debt, the behavior of debt and income over time can be seen by moving along the 
direction of the arrow on a two-dimensional plane in D and Y. 






























                               






   10
III. SOME MODIFICATIONS OF LENDING BEHAVIOR 
  
Without pretense to realism, the above model schematizes a simple mechanism of 
fluctuations in debt and income based on a stock-flow approach. Higher positive flow of 
credit driven by capital gains stimulates consumption and income through higher 
aggregate demand, but, at the same time, exerts a depressing influence on demand 
through the repayment obligations on a higher stock of accumulated debt. This results in 
sustained oscillations similar to some earlier Keynesian models of endogenous business 
cycles, with the important difference that the present model emphases a mechanism 
working through consumption rather than investment (cf., Kalecki [1971], Kaldor [1960], 
and Goodwin [1951 and 1982]).
4  
The model postulates a crisis of confidence on the part of the lenders, as 
borrowers become overindebted and reach a debt ceiling. However, a most obvious flaw 
of the model lies in assuming that this ceiling to the stock of debt is arbitrarily given (at 
E) without any reference to either the ability of the borrowers to repay or the risk faced 
by financial institutions that leads to such a crisis of confidence. More plausibly the 
ceiling might be related to the ability of the borrowers to repay in relation to their 
income. In that case, the lenders face the risk of being caught in a debt trap, as the 
lending institutions fear that the borrowers can only service debt with further loans. When 
reduced to a single-period criterion for lending, the debt adjustment equation (7) can be 
reformulated defining a single-period condition for Ponzi finance as the credit ceiling, 
i.e.,
5  
                                                 
4 In business cycle models in the tradition of Kalecki and Keynes, the positive impact on aggregate demand 
of the flow of investment through the multiplier mechanism is counteracted by the depressing effect of 
capital stock on investment. Mathematically they generate limit cycles (Arrowsmith and Place 1982) or 
fluctuations from delayed response through mixed difference-differential equations (Minorsky 1969). It 
might be mentioned in this context that Lavorie and Godley (2000) made an interesting distinction between 
debt-burdened and debt-financed effective demand. A similar distinction operates here with the flow of 
new debt contributing positively and the stock of inherited debt contributing negatively to aggregate 
demand.  
5 Minsky (1975 and 1986) introduced a perceptive distinction among the three stages in the evolution of the 
financial structure of a firm, as it transits from hedge to speculative to Ponzi finance. Hedge finance allows 
firms to meet their repayment obligations from their expected regular flow of anticipated revenue; in 
speculative finance, firms still meet their obligations, mostly from anticipated revenue flows, but may need 
the occasional injection of “bridge finance” in some periods; in Ponzi finance, continuous outside financial 
injections are needed to meet obligations (Taylor 2004: 261–263). Note the distinction between speculative 
and Ponzi finance has been blurred in our one-period formulation.   11
 
(dD/dt) = θ (Y-ρ D), θ  >0.     (17) 
 
In this simple one-period specification, the flow of credit continues to be positive 
and adjusted to the extent of the gap between income and debt-servicing obligations of 
each period, i.e., (Y – rD) > 0. However, when this gap dwindles to zero, credit reaches 
its ceiling. Accordingly, the flow of credit stops and retirement of debt is governed by the 
equation,  
 
  (dD/dt) = θ  [ ] {m a x( / ) } Y D dD dt ρ −−    (18) 
 
From (6) and (17), setting (dD/dt) =0, it can be seen that the maximum stock of 
debt is determined endogenously as, 
 
     D = D max=mK/(ρ +  rm).    (19) 
 
Assuming that the initial stock of debt is minimum at zero, there is no repayment 
obligation. Consequently, the inflow of credit is maximum at that point and (6) implies 
income is maximum at Y=Y max= mK/(1-θ a) when D =D min= 0 at t=0. For an 
economically meaningful solution,  
 
   Y max>0       (20) 
 
implying, (1- θ a) >0. 
Inserting (6) in (17), the phase of increasing debt is seen to be governed by a first-
order differential equation, 
 
(1- θ a) (dD/dt) = -θ (rm+ρ )D +θ mK ,     (21) 
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having a solution 
 
D = D max(1-e
t λ −  ),       (22) 
 
where λ =  () / ( 1 ) rm a θ ρθ +− . 
Since in view of (20), λ  >0, it follows that at t =0, D= 0, but as t→ ∞, D 
→D max. 
Similarly, inserting (6) in (18), the phase of decreasing debt is guided by the 
differential equation, 
 
     (1- θ a - θρ ) (dD/dt) = -  rm θ D-  max D θρ   +θ mK ,  (23) 
 
which reduces on simplification to 
 
       (dD/dt) =  max,/ [ ( ) 1 ] DD m r a μ μμ θθ ρ − =+ − .   (24) 
 
Theoretically, debt asymptotically approaches its maximum governed by (22). We 
approximate by assuming that for a sufficiently large value of t = t1 debt is arbitrarily 
close to its maximum level and the system then goes into its debt repayment mode 
according to (24), until at t=t 2  when debt again reaches its initial minimum value D= 0. 
In this case the particular solution to (24) can be written as, 
 
D= D max[1- e
2 () tt μ − ],  t 2 ≥t >t1.    (25) 
 
As t increases to t 2 , the stock of debt, D, gradually decreases from its maximum 
to its minimum value of 0 at t = t 2  providedμ  > 0, implying 
 
θ (a+ρ )  >  1.     (26) 
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Thus starting initially (t=0) at D=0, debt asymptotically approaches its maximum 
level D max, coming sufficiently close to it as t becomes arbitrarily large at t = t1 when the 
phase of reduction in debt commences in conformity with (24) to return ultimately to the 
zero debt situation at t = t 2 . Therefore, despite the postulated modifications in lending 
behavior, the qualitative nature of the debt cycle remains similar to the simpler case 
depicted in diagram 1, provided inequalities (20) and (26) are satisfied.
6  
These inequalities can be economically interpreted within the Keynesian 
framework of demand-determined output. Given the magnitude of the multiplier (m), the 
parameter a (=c 2 w) captures the wealth effect operating through capital gains and the 
increase in debt-financed consumption, whileθ  governs the speed with which debt 
increases. Consequently, the product term θ a governs the increase in debt and 
consumption, which has to be less than unity for the income-generation process to be 
stable (condition 20). Similarly, inequality (26), θ ρ > (1-θ a), ensures that repayment 
has to exceed saving from the wealth effect on output for the process of debt reduction to 
be effective.      
  
VI. FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND CRISIS 
 
During the alternating phases of expansion and contraction in economic activity depicted 
in the preceding sections, the financial system providing credit also undergoes 
simultaneous changes. Paradoxically, the fragility of the financial system usually 
increases during the phase of rising income and debt. The expansionary phase encourages 
a general state of economic optimism and “conventions” (Keynes 1937) gain ground that 
this is going to be the normal state of the economy that can be extrapolated into the 
future. Consequently, actors in the economy are encouraged to borrow and lend more 
freely. This tendency is further strengthened by the rising asset prices that typically 
accompany expansion. Not only the financial positions of firms and households in the 
real sector, but also various (especially nonbank) institutions in the financial sector 
                                                 
6 The volume of debt switches from an increasing to a decreasing mode at t1 and the abruptness is still 
present at that point t1.   14
undergo change as they come to rely increasingly on sustained capital gains as the normal 
state of affairs.
7  
This may be viewed as a process of transition towards Ponzi finance for the 
macroeconomy (Minsky 1986).
8 The evolution towards Ponzi finance through rising 
asset prices affects both the real and the financial sector of the economy. Borrowers tend 
to overborrow in relation to their income because they hope to more easily meet 
repayment obligations out of capital gains. Financial firms, too, feel more solvent due to 
rising values of assets on their balance sheet and lend more liberally by relaxing the 
standards of scrutiny. This process is sustained on a macro scale so long as capital gains 
are not actually realized, but generate sufficient economic optimism for both borrowers 
and lenders to take increasingly fragile financial positions characterized by increased 
indebtedness.
9  
As the optimistic view of “business as usual” continues, even the fear of 
unforeseen negative shocks in the future tends to recede to the background and less 
liquidity is held by the financial firms as a precaution against an unknown future (cf., 
Chiarella and Flaschel [2000]). In more conventional terms, this results in a downward 
shift of the (Keynesian) liquidity preference, but with the important difference that it is 
mostly the liquidity preference of the financial firms—and not that of the general 
public—that begins to make the financial system fragile at its core. In particular, 
unregulated by a monetary authority capable of acting as a “lender of last resort,” 
financial firms continue to expand their operations through various innovative 
arrangements characterized by increasingly interlocked assets and capital structures of 
                                                 
7 As already stated (see note 2), the model of the “great moderation” of the Fed was based on this 
assumption. For a critical summary view of this received wisdom, see also Foster and Magdoff (2008). In a 
complex financial system, nonbank financial firms like mutual funds and mortgage banks may increase 
their leverage ratio and hold securities issued by other financial firms (guaranteed by credit rating agencies 
and insurance companies) in the capital base as a close substitute for liquidity. At the end of 2007, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac had astoundingly high leverage ratios of 65 times and 79 times, respectively, while 
the leverage ratio of all the five big investment banks in the United States (Merrill Lynch, Lehman 
Brothers, Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs) hovered anywhere between 33 and 26 times 
(Chitale 2008: 22). 
8 Minsky’s explanation on this point runs mostly in terms of investment behavior of firms in the real sector, 
and many formal modeling exercises followed similar routes (e.g., Taylor and O’Connell [1985]). 
However, the recent crisis once more made clear a familiar pattern from several past experiences. Financial 
crisis often precedes a crisis of the real sector suggesting that the fragility of financial firms might proceed 
faster than that of households and firms in the real sector.  
9 Bhaduri, Laski, and Riese (2006) makes an attempt at modeling along these lines.   15
mutual guarantees and insurances without sufficient liquidity in reserve.
10 The situation 
of rapid expansion of credit further strengthens the boom conditions and the belief that 
this indeed is the normal state of affairs reflecting “economic fundamentals.” However, 
the possibility of a financial meltdown hovers below the surface, because even a 
relatively small (in relation to the total volume of credit advanced) unexpected default in 
obligations would force the concerned financial institutions to raise liquidity immediately 
to sustain the scheme of mutual guarantee. Paradoxically, a high degree of homogeneity 
in optimistic expectations formed by the ruling conventions of good times worsens the 
problem because most other firms (due to their homogeneity in expectations) are 
similarly overextended and are not in a position to provide short-term internal liquidity to 
the system as buyers of financial assets. The concerned financial firm trying to cover the 
defaulted loan is then forced to sell assets immediately, under distress, in a market with 
relatively few buyers.  
We assume that some unanticipated fraction, q, of the volume of loans advanced 
is defaulted, resulting in additional demand for liquidity. We denote this additional 
amount of liquidity required by lending financial institutions as L, which would be larger 
the greater the extent of default (q) and the higher the leverage of the concerned financial 
firms facing default. Moreover, for any given state of uncertainty, when the level of asset 
prices (p) is lower, the substitution against liquidity in favor of assets in the capital base 
of lending firms is stronger. In turn, this results in an intricately interlocked capital 
structure among financial firms that is capable of creating a widespread “correlation 
effect.” While it raises the amount of liquidity required (L) in case of default, there would 
be fewer interlocked financial firms wanting to part with their liquidity. This complex 
financial structure is formally represented as, 
 






)  ,      (27) 
                                                 
10 For instance, an elaborate system of shadow banking populated by mutual funds, mortgage banks, 
brokerage institutions, etc. developed in the United States that provided credit substitutes without 
intermediation of banks. This shadow banking system has been described as having the characteristics of 
“complexity” and “tight coupling” (Bookstaber 2007). The former relates to the mutual interlocking of 
balance sheets and assets, and the latter resembles production on an assembly line where little time is left 
for correction or slow adjustment of portfolios and capital structures, mainly because of the interlocked 
nature of the assets.   16
 
where sign over the relevant variable indicates the sign of its partial derivative.  
Assuming a composite asset for simplicity, the volume of that composite asset to 
be supplied to the market for sale is (L/p) where p = the price level of the composite 
asset. The additional supply of assets to the market for sale (due to default) is given by, 
 
Δ A S  = L/ p        (28) 
 
A stylized representation of the demand for assets in the market would typically 
include two types of traders —the “value traders,” who consider the current price level of 
asset (p) in relation to its long-term value guided by “fundamentals”(π ), and the “trend 
traders,” who focus on the short-term trends in the price of assets (dp/dt). Thus, if (p-
π )>0, value traders consider assets to be overvalued and tend to be bearish. However, 
despite value traders’ bearishness, the price may continue to rise if their bearishness is 
outweighed by the trend traders’ bullish sentiment that prices would continue to rise in 
the near future.
11 When most value and trend traders share a similar bullish or bearish 
sentiment, market sentiments appear relatively homogeneous; when divided, guessing the 
average sentiment that prevails in the market becomes the central concern of traders in 
the stock exchange (Keynes 1930 and 1964).
12  
The demand for assets in the stock exchange is represented by the equation, 
 
A D =F [(p- π ), (dp/dt) ],       (29) 
 
where, for reasons explained above, the partial derivative of the first argument pertains to 
value traders, F1 <0, and that of the second argument relates to trend traders, F 2 > 0.  
                                                 
11 Friedman (1953) ignored the role of trend traders in the market to claim that profitable speculation is 
always stabilizing. 
12 The averaging procedure followed by players in a market of divided expectations (according to Keynes) 
is analogous to guessing the winner of a “beauty competition.” Each player chooses the prettiest face, not 
according to his own criterion, but by guessing what the “average” voter would consider to be the prettiest 
face and then, as further refinement, guessing the average of this average and so on. Taylor (2004) provides 
a lucid account. 
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We postulate (not necessarily realistically!) that the system has an equilibrium at 
p=π , a constant for simplicity of exposition. This implies A D =F [0,0] = S A  at p=π . 
Thus, in the equilibrium state so defined, trend traders are inactive and the value traders’ 
demand price for assets at discounted future profits is π , which equals the supply of 
assets A S  (i.e., the market trades without expectations of capital gains or losses at prices 
determined exclusively by fundamentals).  
The movement in an asset price around equilibrium depends on the excess 
demand and supply created by default, depicted by the asset price adjustment equation, 
 
       (dp/dt) = -γ  [ΔA D - ΔA S ], γ >0.   (30) 
 
Inserting (27), (28), and (29) into (30) and totally differentiating, we obtain, 
 
      d(dp/dt)/dp = γ {[F1] + [L(1-η)/p
2 ]} /(1-γ F 2  ),   (31) 
 
where η= (/) ( / ) p LLp ∂∂<0. 
It might not be implausible to assume that the speed of asset price adjustment, γ , 
in a modern stock market is sufficiently high to make the denominator in the expression 
on the right-hand side of (31) negative, i.e. (1-γ F 2  )< 0. Consequently the stock market 
would be stable around the postulated equilibrium provided the numerator of that 
expression is positive, i.e.,  
 
    [F1] + [L(1-η)/p
2 ]  >0    (32) 
 
Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition for stability boils down to, 
  
        1 - η > - (F1p
2 /L).    (33) 
   18
Since η  is negative, the left-hand side of (33) is unambiguously positive; so is the 
right-hand side because F1 <0. However, other things held constant, the right-hand side 
decreases in value as L becomes larger, i.e., higher demand for liquidity tends to 
destabilize the market. Similarly, lower asset prices also tend to destabilize. 
The slope on the left-hand side of equation (31) measures the rate of change of 
price (dp/dt) in response to an increase in the price level (p). In other words, the stability 
of the asset market requires the rate of increase in asset prices to be lower as the price 
level of the asset goes higher. 
The stability condition is easily seen in the one-variable phase diagram, below. 
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V. SUMMING UP: MODELS AND REALITY 
 
At the outset of this paper it was pointed out that loss of confidence either in or by the 
financial sector invariably emerges as the prominent symptom in most financial crisis.
13 
This is hardly surprising because trust and mutual confidence are essential public goods 
for the smooth functioning of a modern financial system. This paper attempted to probe 
                                                 
13 This experience of collapse of confidence has repeated itself many times in different episodes (Rogoff 
and Reinhart 2008). 
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deeper into this general idea by showing how loss of confidence can arise in two 
analytically distinct ways. The simple model constructed in sections II and III depict how 
the financial sector might lose confidence in an overindebted public that is increasingly 
overburdened with debt in relation to income. In contrast, the argument of section IV 
proceeds along a less traveled route. It traces the collapse of confidence to a “fragile” 
financial sector itself, as it becomes increasingly incapable of coping with its contingent 
liquidity requirements due to overlending. In reality, these two routes are intertwined 
because overborrowing cannot take place without overlending and vice versa; yet, it 
might be useful to separate them analytically both for a better understanding of particular 
events and for informed policy discussions.  
To avoid misunderstanding it should be emphasized that the present paper does 
not deal with any other source of loss of financial confidence that might arise from 
growing international indebtedness. However, in some ways the country concerned 
resembles an overindebted borrower discussed in sections II and III, but it has several 
other dimensions, like exchange rate speculation, international power relations, etc., so 
that the analogy must not be misleadingly overstretched.  
The loss of confidence in an overburdened borrower would arise in an extreme 
case when, as a special case of Ponzi finance, the borrower tries to borrow simply to 
repay loans, defining the credit ceiling in section III. Nevertheless, so long as income 
grows sufficiently, this credit ceiling might never be reached. The debt-financed 
consumption model developed here accommodates income growth mostly through the 
expansion of aggregate demand caused by credit expansion linked to capital gains. This 
underplays (for reasons of exposition) the role of credit and the possible impact of the 
“wealth effect” on investment. However, in so far as investment is also influenced by 
changing asset values and impacts on the growth of income, the model is incomplete and 
extension in this direction might be crucial for characterizing a crisis, even one of 
exclusively domestic origin.
14 While several important issues (like the impact of the 
                                                 
14 Valuation of real, as well as financial, assets influence investors’ decision of acquisition versus physical 
investment in new capacity. This original suggestion by Keynes’s “two price theory of investment” was 
reformulated subsequently by Tobin (1969), but without complications arising from capital gains. Minsky 
(1975 and 1986) reinterpreted it by accommodating the possibility of capital gains and changing 
expectations, which, in turn, affect investment. The present analysis does not try to model investment 
behavior in any serious way.   21
wealth effect on investment affecting income growth or problems of external 
indebtedness affecting, in particular, the stability of the exchange rate) have been 
deliberately left out of our formal analysis, the usefulness of a limited model of this kind 
should perhaps be judged differently. Its intention is not to represent reality—even 
imperfectly—but to isolate analytically the working of some crucial mechanisms. The 
mechanism highlighted in this paper suggests that the fragility of the financial system 
emerges for the very prosperity of the real economy placing the goods- and services-
producing real sector and its accompanying financial sector in an awkward juxtaposition 
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